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23 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussions on SALT, Wednesday, 18 May 1977

- Must maintain our options for the cruise missiles.
 - ° Must not be vulnerable if the agreement breaks down.
- Must not yield to a perception of military inferiority.
- Must keep our bombers.
 - ° Want to decrease SLBMs.
 - ° Want to decrease BACKFIRES.
 - ° Want to eliminate mobile missiles.
 - ° Want to be verifiable.
 - ° Want to lead to large reductions in the long term.
 - ° Want to avoid discussion of FBS.
- Vance's mission is to "think out loud."
 - ° Looking to a two-year extension.
 - ° The two-year extension to include no testing of ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles greater than 600 kilometers.
 - ° Could test ground-launched and sea-launched from aircraft.
- Baker - pleased that the minority was represented.

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- Hart - what impact would Brezhnev's demise have?
(Dobrynin indicated a possibility of a ten percent reduction.)
- Stennis - take your time.
- Tower - funding the MX would be feasible, especially if the agreements broke down.
- Jackson - off to a good start.
 - ° Must have the will to stay the course.
 - ° World perception is important, especially China.
 - ° Cruise missile is leverage (mechanics of verifying the SSX-16 are difficult - we want a limit of 190 SLBMs - we do not want heavy bombers counted within the MIRV ceiling.)
- Cranston - do not test greater than 2,500 or you'll never be able to stop the other side from achieving that capability.

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